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TWO CATEGORIES OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT'
Eric Schnapper*
Introduction
In an opinion that doubtless was intended to clarify a con-
fused area of the law, 2 the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis3 held that proof of invidious intent was necessary to establish
a claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination. The Court
appeared confident that determining the presence of discrimina-
tory intent would not be a difficult task, particularly because the
Court found it had applied the doctrine in more than a dozen of
* B.A., M.A. Johns Hopkins University, 1962, 1963; B. Phil. Oxford
University, 1965; LL.B. Yale University, 1968. Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. Lecturer in Law, Columbia University.
I For a discussion of the problems which derive from the use of the terms
"intent" and "purpose," see infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
2 The state of the law was confused because in certain previous decisions, in-
cluding one involving a claim of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court refused
to inquire into legislative motives. E.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-84 (1968). See gen-
erally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 S. Ct. Rev. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205 (1970). Prior to Washington
v. Davis, many lower courts had held that proof that an action had a substan-
tial disparate impact on a racial minority was sufficient to establish a constitu-
tional violation. E.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d
725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972);
Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. City
of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Il. 1974); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Ex-
tension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part,
528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187
(D. Md. 1973), modified in part, affd in part sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486
F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
3426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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its previous decisions .4 Although the Court has not questioned the
intent doctrine since Washington v. Davis, it has exhibited in-
creasing confusion as to how to apply it in particular cases.,
This Article suggests that the Court's current confusion
derives in part from its failure to distinguish between two
categories of discriminatory intent, which may be termed goal
discrimination and means discrimination. Goal discrimination in-
volves the invidious consideration of race in the selection of the
objective which a government policy seeks to achieve.6 Means
discrimination occurs when there is an invidious consideration of
race in selecting or weighing the method to be used in achieving
that objective. Both forms of discrimination fall within the equal
protection clause's prohibition against discriminatory government
action, but they involve different circumstances and thus must be
proved in somewhat different ways. Recognition of the distinc-
tion between the two categories leads to a more objective method
of analyzing evidence of intentional discrimination and con-
tributes to a greater understanding of the meaning of the equal
protection clause.
I. Doctrinal Confusion
Over the last six years the Supreme Court has dealt with a
variety of equal protection challenges to facially neutral govern-
ment actions. Washington v. Davis concerned a written examina-
tion, used in selecting city police officers, which excluded a
disproportionate number of non-white applicants Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corpo-
ration8 presented a challenge to the constitutionality of the village's
4 426 U.S. at 239-41. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
1 This confusion has been noted elsewhere. See, e.g., Schwemm, From
Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal
Protection Litigation, 1977 U. Ill. L.F. 961; Note, Discriminatory Purpose and
Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment after Feeney, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1376,
1377 (1979).
6 For simplicity, the discussion which follows refers in general to discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, but it is equally applicable to cases involving discrimina-
tion on any other impermissible basis, such as sex, national origin, or religion.
426 U.S. at 234-36.
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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refusal to rezone vacant property to permit the construction of
multi-family housing which would have been occupied in large
part by minority families. In Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney,9 the plaintiffs contended that the
statutory preference given to veterans in filling state jobs
discriminated against women. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 0 the
plaintiffs urged that the at-large method of electing members of
the city commission was adopted and maintained for the purpose
of discriminating against blacks. In each of these cases, the
Supreme Court refused to find that the government's action in-
volved unconstitutional discriminatory intent.
This identity of outcome does not reflect any broad consen-
sus regarding the legal standard for determining the presence of
invidious intent. In Washington v. Davis, six justices joined the
portion of the opinion holding that proof of discriminatory in-
tent, and not merely proof of a disparate impact on a racial
minority, was necessary to establish a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause. But Washington v. Davis said little about how
such intent might be proved other than to suggest that it "may
often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts."'12 In Arl-
9 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
10 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
" Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1976), is often discussed as part of the
line of cases beginning with Washington v. Davis. See, e.g., Schwemm, supra
note 5, at 1034-48. In Castaneda, Mexican-American plaintiffs challenged a Texas
grand jury selection process. Relying on statistical evidence showing that it was
virtually impossible that a random selection of jurors could have led to the selec-
tion of the small number of Mexican-Americans actually picked for grand jury
duty, the Court found that a prima facie case of intentional discrimination had
been established. 430 U.S. at 495-97. Because the state introduced no evidence
in rebuttal, the Court concluded that the grand jury selection process violated
the equal protection clause. Id. at 501. Castaneda, however, differs from others
in the Washington v. Davis line of cases in an important respect, for there was
no claim in Castaneda that the selection of a small number of Mexican-Americans
was due to some specific legitimate selection criterion. See Schwemm, supra note
5, at 1042. The Court disagreed about the proper interpretation of both the
statistical evidence and the fact that three out of the five commissioners who
selected grand jurors were Mexican-Americans. See 430 U.S. at 501 (Marshall,
J., concurring); id. at 504 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 507 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
12 426 U.S. at 242.
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ington Heights, seven members of the Court joined in the portion
of the opinion listing several types of facts which would be rele-
vant to a claim of discriminatory intent. 13 But the ability of the
Court to muster a substantial majority in these two cases may
have been based in part on the fact that in neither had the plain-
tiff sought in the trial court to establish the presence of
discriminatory intent. 14
This apparent consensus evaporated when the Court finally
was confronted by Feeney, which had been tried and decided by
the district court under the intent standard.15 Five members of the
Court concluded that, in weighing a challenge to a statutory
classification with an adverse impact on women, it was necessary
to decide two distinct questions: "whether the statutory classifica-
tion is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender-based"16
and "whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based
discrimination."' 7 Justices Stevens and White doubted whether
there was "any difference between the two questions";18 they
thought that the allegation of discriminatory intent was refuted
merely by the fact that the veterans' preference also disadvantag-
ed a large number of male non-veterans, 19 a fact to which the rest
13 429 U.S. at 264-68. The Court identified four evidentiary factors as proper
subjects of an inquiry into the presence of discriminatory intent: disparate im-
pact, a history of discriminatory official actions, procedural and substantive
departures from the norms generally followed by the decisionmaker, and the
legislative or administrative history of the decision. Id.
Justice White dissented on the ground that the court of appeals in Arlington
Heights had rendered its opinion prior to the decision in Washington v. Davis.
Id. at 272-73 (White, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice White criticized the
majority for embarking on what he viewed as an unnecessary discussion of the
intent requirement. Id. Justice Stevens did not participate in the consideration
or decision of the case.
'1 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 270
n.20; id. at 272-73 (White, J., dissenting); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at
238 & n.8. See also supra note 3.
11 See Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 146-50 (D. Mass. 1978)
(three-judge panel).
"442 U.S. at 274.
'7 Id. For a discussion of the difference between the two questions, see infra text
accompanying notes 44-49.
"442 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J., joined by White, J., concurring).
"Id. ("However the question is phrased, for me the answer is largely provided
by the fact that the number of males disadvantaged by the Massachusetts'
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of the Court attached less importance. Justices Marshall and
Brennan made no use of the majority's bipartite analysis and
disagreed with its conclusion that there was no discriminatory
intent.20
In City of Mobile, the Court had before it a complete record
in which the plaintiffs had attempted to demonstrate, 2' and on
which both the district court22 and court of appeals" had found,
discriminatory intent. Yet, after criticizing the appellate court's
analysis of the evidence, the four-member plurality declined to
decide whether the city's at-large electoral system was maintained
with that intent.24 Five members of the Court, in five separate
opinions, concluded that discriminatory intent had been
shown.25 A majority of the Court thus disagreed with the plurality's
limited analysis of the evidence, 26 but the separate opinions reveal
no common approach to the problem of determining the presence
of intent. The plaintiff failed to prevail because, in an opinion
joined by no other member of the Court, Justice Stevens held
that an otherwise legitimate political decision about electoral
districting could not be "invalidated simply because an irrational
or invidious purpose played some part in the decisionmaking
process." 27
This increasing conflict within the Court about how to prove
intentional discrimination does not appear to reflect any serious
inclination to abandon the intent requirement of Washington v.
Davis, but the six member majority from that case clearly is in
veterans' preference... is sufficiently large-and sufficiently close to the number
of disadvantaged females... -to refute the claim that the rule was intended to
benefit males as a class over females.'). For a discussion of Justice Stevens' argu-
ment, see infra note 82.
o 442 U.S. at 281-89 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
21 The author was one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs.
" Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 397-98 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
2 Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238,245-46 (5th Cir. 1978).
24446 U.S. at 74 n.21.
Id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 92, 94 Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 95,
103 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 136-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26 See 446 U.S. at 73-74.
27 Id. at 92 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
1982]
36 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 17
disarray. Justice White, the author of Washington v. Davis, has
declined to join the decisions purporting to implement that
opinion, choosing instead to dissent twice and to concur once. 29
Disparate impact, described as an "important starting point" in
Arlington Heights,30 was the keystone of the lower court opinions
overturned in Feeney and City of Mobile. A history of "a series
of official actions taken for invidious purposes," cited as a
significant "evidentiary source" in Arlington Heights,31 was
dismissed in City of Mobile as "of limited help." 3 2
The current controversy within the Court is regrettable for
several reasons. First, clear guidance as to how discriminatory in-
tent is to be proved, far from emerging from the case law,
appears increasingly remote. Thus, the outcome of litigation in
the lower courts is not only unpredictable, but also subject to the
attitudes or even biases of the judges involved, a particularly
unacceptable situation as to an issue of such constitutional
importance. 33 Equally seriously, the nature of the protection act-
ually afforded by the equal protection clause remains unclear to
legislators and the public, as well as to judges and litigants. Final-
ly, the Court's own inability to agree as to whether or not, and
why, discriminatory intent has been proven creates the ap-
pearance that the Court is not merely deciding some factual mat-
ter, to which liberal or conservative philosophies would be irrele-
vant, but is making a judgment colored by its view of the wisdom
of the challenged policies.
21 Justice White dissented in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 272-73, and in City
of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 94-103. See also supra note 13.
29 Justice White concurred in Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281. See also supra note 19.
30 429 U.S. at 266.
11 Id. at 267. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,208-11 (1973).
1 446 U.S. at 74.
11 See id. at 103 (White, J., dissenting)(the plurality's approach "leaves the
courts below adrift on uncharted seas with respect to how to proceed on re-
mand"). See also Schwemm, supra note 5, at 1001. Noting the split in the Court
in Castaneda, see supra note 11, Professor Schwemm concludes, "The lack of
consensus that surfaced in Castaneda is not surprising. Indeed, it is a fairly safe
prediction that courts will be struggling with problems concerning the applica-
tion of the purposeful discrimination requirement for years." Schwemm, supra
note 5, at 1001.
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II. The Two Categories of Discrimination
A. The Concept of Means Discrimination
To understand the concept of discriminatory intent, it is
necessary to understand how the values and concerns of an in-
dividual or institution, whether laudably altruistic or deplorably
bigoted, bring about and shape specific actions. When a person
or organization decides whether to undertake a particular course
of action, two types of questions are considered. The first con-
cerns what may be called the goal or end of the proposed
action-the particular consequences whose realization is the
reason for taking any action at all. This is likely to be the matter
which provokes consideration of the action and which may be the
initial subject of discussion. The decisionmaker must resolve
whether the proffered goal is a desirable one and assess whether
the proposed action will in fact achieve that goal.
But that is not the only matter which must be resolved; the
decisionmaker also must consider the means by which that goal is
to be achieved. Any course of action may and usually will involve
consequences other than achievement of the goal involved. These
consequences will often be undesirable. At the least, time, energy,
or money will have to be expended.
For a government, the situation is more complex. The pro-
posed action presumably will confer benefits on some individual
or group of individuals, but the conduct mandated by the official
decision often would have occurred voluntarily if it benefited
everyone affected. Ordinarily, the government finds it necessary
to act precisely because the action involved, while arguably con-
ferring a net benefit on society, does so by providing benefits to
one group of individuals which exceed the burdens it imposes on
other individuals.14 Even where all citizens benefit from an action,
the burdens will not necessarily correlate with the benefits re-
ceived by each, and in some individual cases, the costs of the
burdens may exceed the value of the benefits.
31 "'Legislative' decisionmakers are expected to take action that may benefit one
group at the expense of another; that is the nature of the process." Note, supra
note 5, at 1383 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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Thus, a decisionmaker usually considers not only the goals
of a proposed policy but also the consequences of the means
available for achieving those goals. The action will not be taken,
however desirable its goal, if the burdens imposed by the means
necessary to accomplish the goal outweigh the benefits gained by
its achievement. The decisionmaker will, to a varying extent, be
aware of or assume the existence of these consequences; his or her
immediate task is to decide whether or not those consequences are
acceptable. This analysis is occasionally quantified in a financial
cost-benefit ratio. More frequently, the weighing of the burdens
imposed by the means for achieving the goal involves far more
subjective considerations. Critical to such an analysis is the fact
that the individuals receiving the benefits of the goal and the in-
dividuals subject to the burdens of the means are often different
people.
Most policy making therefore involves two distinct types of
choices: decisions regarding goals and decisions regarding the
means for achieving those goals. Either type of decision could be
made on a racial basis. Both categories afford a public official
the opportunity to discriminate among individuals according to
his or her prejudices about their worth or importance as human
beings.
There are several types of discriminatory goals which an of-
ficial might pursue. The most common racist goals are to confer
a comparative advantage on whites, such as by hiring only white
job applicants, or to segregate individuals on the basis of race. In
particularly egregious instances, harm is inflicted on a minority
individual solely because of his or her race even though no direct
advantage accrues to whites. In addition, a single action could be
intended to achieve two goals; thus, an employee might be
dismissed both because of his or her race and because of tardi-
ness. In such a case, a determination would have to be made as
to whether the same action would have been taken absent the
racial goal. 35
3 See City of Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)(teacher who was
dismissed in part for exercising first amendment rights and in part for making
obscene gestures must be reinstated unless school board can show he would have
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Race might also affect a decision about means in a variety of
ways. First, a choice between two available means-both effec-
tive in achieving the goal, although not necessarily equally so-
might be made on the basis of the racial consequences of each.
Thus, a needed urban freeway might be built to run through and
destroy part of a black community rather than a predominantly
white area.36 Second, where there is only one means to achieve a
given goal, the decisionmaker might conclude that the burden im-
posed by the means outweighed the benefits of the goal if those
burdens were to fall on whites, but not if they were to fall on
blacks.3 7 The same highway project might go forward if the only
available route were through a black neighborhood but be re-
jected if the only route were through a white community. Third,
there might be a trade-off between the extent to which, or speed
with which, a goal was achieved and the collateral burdens impos-
ed by the alternative means involved. A decisionmaker might
select a different extent or speed of accomplishment of the goal
according to whether the price was to be paid by blacks or by
been dismissed absent his exercise of first amendment rights). The burden of
proof lies with the defendant, and it is a heavy burden indeed, for any reconstruc-
tion of what would have occurred absent the forbidden motive is often
speculative. Discriminatory motive usually is concealed when acted upon and
later falsely denied. Thus, the truthfulness of those involved will frequently be
in serious doubt when this issue arises. See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 270 n.21.
11 A similar example appears in Samford, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition
of Racial Discrimination, 25 Emory L.J. 509, 514 (1976). Professor Samford
recognizes that race may enter into the decision about where to build the highway,
but he fails to make the critical distinction between goals and means. See id.
at 514, 574-75.
17 The fact that a given set of racial consequences necessarily follows from seek-
ing or achieving a particular goal does not mean that those consequences are
"inevitable" and therefore irrelevant. When a government with finite resources
undertakes one project, it necessarily forsakes the ability to pursue another. In
this sense, the choice of any goal is a choice among goals, and thus among
beneficiaries. Thus, where a city proposes to build a playground in an all-white
area, the fact that this may be the only available site for a playground does
not mean that the building of an all-white playground was the result of some
impersonal historical imperative. The city has other ways to spend its money-
such as building a swimming pool in an integrated neighborhood. The choice
among these competing goals may turn on the racial consequences of each.
19821
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whites. If a city could relocate in a year the total population
displaced by one mile of highway, it might choose on a racial
basis to build one mile a year while construction was in white
areas but at a rate of three miles a year in black neighborhoods.
Fourth, realization of the goal itself may have certain conse-
quences no matter how it is achieved, and those consequences
might be evaluated on a racial basis. Building a new highway will
reduce the business of restaurants and gas stations along the old
route; this might be viewed as acceptable if the owners of these
firms were black but not if they were white.
Most collateral decisions involve the first three subcategories
and concern the means by which a goal is to be achieved. 38 In
many cases, these racial decisions will be based not on an affir-
mative desire to harm blacks, but on a greater willingness to see
a given burden borne by blacks than by whites, an attitude that
Professor Brest has aptly described as "racially selective
indifference."39
38 The balance of the Article refers to all four subcategories of this second
category of discrimination as "means discrimination." There is no significant
functional difference between a decision based on the inevitable collateral con-
sequences of achieving a goal and a decision based on the collateral consequences
of the only means available for accomplishing that end.
31 Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term -Foreword: In Defense of theAnti-
discrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1976).
The distinction between goal and means discrimination makes discussions
about "unconscious" racism more intelligible, for the purpose of both concepts
is to emphasize that discrimination may enter into government decisions in forms
more subtle than an affirmative desire to harm blacks.
The concept of "institutional" or "unconscious" racism has struck many
listeners as troubling if not simply self-contradictory. So long as "discrimina-
tion" is understood to refer only to discrimination as to ends, the phrase "un-
conscious racism" is on its face almost nonsensical-an accusation that a deci-
sionmaker was seeking a goal he was unaware he was seeking. Ordinarily, what
we mean by "goal" is the state of affairs the decisionmaker has in mind and
hopes to bring about. Although in the field of psychology unconscious goals
are often important, legal analysis and discussions of public policy have fairly
consistently confined their consideration of goals to those of which the deci-
sionmaker was cognizant. To assert that a public official unconsciously wanted
to disadvantage blacks would be to make a statement whose relevance to law
or public policy is hard to ascertain. On the other hand, to assert that discrimina-
tion as to means is unconscious is to make a statement far less Freudian-that
the decisionmaker knew the burdens of the decision fell on blacks, that had those
Discriminatory Intent
B. "Goals" and "Means" in the Supreme Court
Although discrimination in the selection of goals and
discrimination in the consideration of means are analytically
distinct problems and are proved in somewhat different ways, the
Supreme Court's opinions consistently confuse the two.
Washington v. Davis, for example, states that "the central pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause.. .is the prevention of
official conduct discriminating on the basis of race," 40 as if to
suggest that any decision that is based on racial grounds, whether
regarding ends or means, is unconstitutional. But the opinion's
repeated references to statutes "designed to serve neutral ends"
appear to exclude means discrimination. 4' Arlington Heights
asserts that for constitutional purposes race is "not just another
competing consideration,"4 2 which implies that considering race at
all, not considering it in making a particular type of decision, is
forbidden. Yet, in the next sentence, the opinion suggests that the
burdens fallen instead on whites, the decisionmaker would have acted differently,
but that at the time of the actual decision the decisionmaker did not, in fact,
consider what he or she would do were the racial impact of the decision different.
A shift in terminology may be important to furthering the discussion of
racial discrimination. If, as frequently would be the case, the phrase is understood
to denote goal discrimination, to accuse someone of "unconscious racism" is
to make an assertion which may not be true and which may well seem unintel-
ligible, even though discrimination is, in fact, present. Rather than forcing the
decisionmaker to recognize the discrimination implicit in his or her choice of
means, such an accusation may alienate the decisionmaker and lead him or her
to disregard the charge. A court asked to rule upon the matter may react simi-
larly. Somewhat different consequences follow from an argument that a policy
should not be pursued because it imposes burdens on blacks that would be un-
acceptable if imposed on whites. This contention invites the decisionmaker to
reflect on a question not in fact considered previously-whether the same deci-
sion about means would be made if the burdens fell on whites rather than blacks.
The likelihood that an ordinary public dialogue would bring about a change
in policy seems materially greater if the proponent of change merely seeks to
persuade the decisionmaker to consider candidly what he or she would do if
the burdens of the policy fell on whites, rather than if that proponent seeks
to persuade the decisionmaker to acknowledge and denounce a subconscious
motive.
40 426 U.S. at 239.
4' See id. at 248; see also id. at 242, 245-46.
42 Id. at 265-66.
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issue is whether discrimination was a "motivating factor,' 43 a
phrase that seems to refer more narrowly to the goal underlying
the action.
It is in Feeney that the Court's failure to distinguish between
ends and means is most apparent. One passage states that the
issue is whether discrimination "influenced the legislative choice,"
a phrasing which includes both categories of discrimination, but
then contends that the issue is whether the disputed veterans'
preference was enacted "for the purpose of giving an advantage
to males," a formulation which seems to cover only discrimina-
tory goals.44 The Court used a goal analysis in rejecting the lower
court's holding that the legislature's awareness of the adverse
impact of the preference gave rise to an inference that the
legislature intended that impact:
"Discriminatory purpose"... implies more than in-
tent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.
It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite
of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Yet
nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference
for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-
enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal
of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place
in the Massachusetts Civil Service. 4
4' Id. at 266.
' 442 U.S. at 277.
11 Id. at 279 (emphasis added). As used in Feeney, the phrase "adverse impact"
apparently refers to the comparatively greater burden the disputed preference
places on women. Thus, to assert that the decision is made "in spite of' that
impact is to state that the decisionmaker regrets that the burdens were not
distributed more equitably. This rule is not quite as broad as the prohibition
argued for in this Article, for a decisionmaker who regrets an adverse impact
on blacks might object far more strenuously to a similar impact on whites. Where
such a decisionmaker acts "in spite of" an adverse impact on blacks which would
be intolerable if imposed on whites, the decision remains one based on race.
The lower court in Feeney invalidated the veterans' preference largely on
the ground that the preference had "the natural, foreseeable, and inevitable ef-
fect of producing a discriminatory impact." Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F.
Supp. 143, 147, 149-50 (D. Mass. 1978)(three-judge panel); id. at 151 (Camp-
bell, J., concurring). In applying the foreseeable disparate impact test, the district
1982] Discriminatory Intent 43
Structurally, the two-part test employed in the Feeney major-
ity opinion for determining the presence of intent46 comes close to
court came close to recognizing the distinction between goals and means
discrimination, for the court emphasized that the state may not discriminate in
achieving a legitimate goal:
It is clear that the Commonwealth's motive was to benefit its veterans.
Equally clear, however, is that its intent was to achieve that purpose
by subordinating employment opportunities of its women. The course
of action chosen by the Commonwealth had the inevitable consequence
of discriminating against the women of this state. The fact that the
Commonwealth had a salutary motive does not justify its intention
to realize that end by disadvantaging its women.
Id. at 149-50. Judge Campbell's concurring opinion explicitly suggested the critical
distinction in its discussion of the foreseeable disparate impact standard:
This same inevitability of exclusionary impact upon women also
undermines the argument of no discriminatory intent. There is a dif-
ference between goals and intent. Conceding, as we all must, that the
goal here was to benefit the veteran, there is no reason to absolve
the legislature from awareness that the means chosen to achieve this
goal would freeze women out of all those state jobs actively sought
by men .... Where a law's consequences are that inevitable, can they
meaningfully be described as intended? Doubtless the impact of [sic]
women, if considered at all, was regarded as an acceptable "cost" of
aiding veterans. But may society properly elect to aid veterans or any
other group at the cost of abolishing equal employment opportunities
in a major segment of public employment? In my view the answer
is "no".
Id. at 151 (Campbell, J., concurring).
Because the district court employed the foreseeable disparate impact test,
it failed to separate fully decisions about means from decisions about goals.
Rather than inquiring into why the legislature was willing to accept the cost of
the means chosen for benefiting veterans, the court apparently presumed that,
because that cost-the discriminatory impact on women-was foreseeable, the
legislature must have intended that impact. The court thus failed to recognize
explicitly that, because decisions about goals and decisions about means are
analytically distinct, discriminatory intent actually may enter into either or both.
For a discussion of how the foreseeable disparate impact test differs from the
concept of means discrimination, see infra text accompanying notes 74-77.
The Supreme Court in Feeney focused on the district court's use of the
foreseeable disparate impact test. See 442 U.S. at 278-80. And the Court con-
cluded that a foreseeable disparate impact, although of evidentiary value, was
not by itself dispositive of whether discriminatory intent was present. See id.
at 279 & n.25.
4See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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recognizing the critical distinction. In goal-like language,47 part
III(A) inquires whether the preference is a "pretext" for advanc-
ing men, while part III(B) asks more broadly if discriminatory in-
tent "in some measure shaped ' 4 the state law. The Court,
however, in answering the latter inquiry collapsed the second part
of the test into the first part. Instead of discussing whether a
hostile attitude toward women led the legislature to accept the
harm caused by the veterans' preference or to choose the par-
ticularly extreme form of preference involved in the case, the
Court merely repeated its conclusions from part III(A) that the
goal of the preference was not to advantage men and that the
legislative goal of giving veterans a competitive headstart was
legitimate. 49
The Feeney opinion persuasively demonstrates that harming
women was not the goal of the veterans' preference. But the
adverse impact on women was the social cost of achieving the
goal of helping veterans. Unconsidered was why the legislature
was willing to accept that cost or why the state had chosen this ex-
treme form of preference to reward veterans for their service to
the nation rather than any of the "wide variety of less
discriminatory means" 5 0 available.
The ambiguity in the Court's terminology reflects its confu-
sion of the two categories of discrimination. 51 Although "pur-
pose" ordinarily refers to the goal of an action, Washington v.
Davis and its progeny often employ the phrase "discriminatory
purpose" as if it meant the opposite of "inadvertent dispropor-
tionate racial impact. ' 52 "Purpose" and "purposefully" are re-
11 Id. at 275. Indeed one passage in part III(B) refers to the district court fin-
ding upheld in III(A) as being one that "the goals of the preference" were "wor-
thy." 442 U.S. at 277-78.
41 Id. at 276.
41 Id. at 276-78.
S0 Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"1 See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 1004 n.250; Note, supra note 5 at 1379 n.23.
12 See, e.g., 426 U.S. at 239 ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition
that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
discriminatory impact.").
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ferred to as if they indicated the same state of mind53 even
though "purposefully" has a broader connotation which is closer
to "not unintentionally." "Purpose" and "intent" are used inter-
changeably although the meaning of "intent" seems broader. 54
"Deliberately" 15 is also used, a term which perhaps most clearly
means only "not inadvertently."
The Supreme Court's failure to distinguish between discrimi-
nation as to ends and discrimination as to means and to resolve
the question of means discrimination presented by Feeney is due,
at least in part, to the types of race cases that historically have
come before the Court. Until the last decade, the discrimination
with which the federal courts have been concerned was largely
limited to practices fashioned overtly and avowedly to achieve
racist goals. When Governor Faubus of Arkansas excluded nine
black children from Little Rock's Central High, 6 when Prince
Edward County, Virginia shut its entire school system in the face
of an integration order,57 when Alabama redrew the Tuskegee
boundary lines to remove virtually all blacks from the city," and
when southern jury commissioners systematically deleted blacks
from jury rolls,59 everyone knew perfectly well what they were up
to. In the days of such open and notorious discrimination, the
issue before the Court was not the intent of the defendant state
officials but the firmness of the federal courts and their unwill-
53 Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945))("A purpose to discriminate must be present.... ) with
id. at 240 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964))(in a gerry-
mandering case, the issue is whether the "boundaries... were purposefully drawn
on racial lines").
-1 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 73-74; Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. at 276-77; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
at 265, 268. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 1004 & n.250, 1021; Note, supra
note 5, at 1379 n.23.
11 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625, 628-29 (1972)).
-1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
51 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
51 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
11 See, e.g., Simms v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Arnold v. North Carolina,
376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398 (1945).
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ingness to tolerate further delay in obedience to the
Constitution 0
The conceptual difficulties which now exist began when the
Court, familar with and expecting disputes of such clarity, was
faced with cases involving complex and covert motives. When
Palmer v. Thompson6' confronted the Court with a claim of dis-
criminatory intent which was seriously, if not very plausibly, con-
tested, five Justices were so confounded that they disavowed any
intent standard. Not until Washington v. Davis was the intent re-
quirement firmly established. After a century of deciding cases
involving problems of overt goal discrimination, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court has had difficulty in recognizing and analyzing
claims of covert means discrimination.
III. The Unconstitutionality of Means Discrimination
Although means discrimination and goal discrimination are
distinct phenomena, a variety of considerations support the con-
clusion that a racially-based decision regarding means is as repug-
nant to the Constitution as a racially-based choice of goals. The
constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination derives
from several related principles-that the color of a person's skin
is rarely if ever related to any legitimate government objective, 62
that any distinction on the basis of race is likely to be grounded
on blind prejudices about the qualities or worth of some racial
group, 63 that treating people differently because of their ancestry is
inherently "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality," 64 and that government action on
this basis stigmatizes the group involved, causing a harm that
60 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1(1971); Alex-
ander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969)(per curiam); Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526
(1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
61 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
62 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See also Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355 (1978)(Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-58 (Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. at 100.
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transcends the immediate benefit denied or burden imposed.65
These concerns are as applicable to a racially-based decision
regarding means as they would be to a racially-based choice of
goals. When a burden has been placed on, or a benefit denied to,
an individual because of his or her race, that individual's moral
claim is the same regardless of whether race affected a decision as
to ends or a decision as to means. The manner in which the deci-
sionmaker's prejudices led to the imposition of that burden, or
the denial of that benefit, has no relevance to the principles
underlying the equal protection clause.
To give effect to those principles, the Supreme Court has
developed the doctrine of strict scrutiny, which is used to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a racially-based decision that was
not premised on prejudices about the racial group whose
members are burdened by that decision. Under strict scrutiny
analysis, a racial classification is permissible if the government
proves that it is narrowly drawn to further a compelling state in-
terest which cannot be advanced by a less onerous method. 6 But
to assert that a racially-based act is justified in the furtherance of
such a legitimate interest is to assert that racial considerations
entered into the selection and fashioning of the means of achiev-
ing that goal, rather than in the choice of the goal itself. Thus,
strict scrutiny analysis is a method of determining when a
racially-based means of achieving a legitimate nonracial end is,
and is not, constitutional.6 7 Clearly, the existence of a rule deter-
mining when a racially-based means decision is permissible
11 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See also
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits
on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by
the individuals burdened.... These individuals are likely to find little
comfort in the notion that the deprivation.., is inspired by the sup-
posedly benign purpose of aiding others.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34 (Powell, J.)(em-
phasis in original).
"See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
67 As Professor Perry has noted,
The central prohibition of the equal protection clause is directed
against the government's deliberate use of race as a criterion of selec-
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precludes any possibility that racially-based means decisions are
always constitutional.
The most established method of proving unconstitutional
discriminatory intent is one which does not distinguish between
discrimination as to ends and discrimination as to means.
Although there is considerable confusion as to how to determine
the purpose of an individual policy decision, where a series of
decisions is involved, the Court has settled upon a frequently used
and workable standard of proof. Faced with a number of choices
regarding the selection of jurors68 or employees,6 9 the Court will
find discrimination if the choices reveal a pattern which can be
explained only as "racially premised." 70 Accordingly, while it
might be difficult to ascertain the intent behind an isolated deci-
sion to reject a particular black employee, a finding of discrimi-
natory intent ordinarily is justified where an employer consider-
ing a large number of applications systematically rejects all
blacks.
This accepted method of proof encompasses both
discrimination as to ends and discrimination as to means; either
can yield a pattern explicable only in terms of race. Thus, with
regard to zoning practices of the sort involved in Arlington
Heights, a pattern of rejecting every zoning change sought by any
prospective black buyer would be within the the established
statistical method of proof, but so would a pattern of granting
zoning variances for multiple unit housing, such as housing for
senior citizens, which would be predominantly white, while deny-
ing them for low income housing which would be predominantly
black. The former would be an example of a discriminatory goal,
whereas the latter, particularly in the absence of efforts to ex-
clude blacks able to purchase single family homes, might reflect
tion. A law might employ a racial criterion of selection as a means
to an objective, or purpose, having nothing to do with race. Such
a law does not have a discriminatory purpose but, because it employs
a racial criterion, is nonetheless subject to strict scrutiny.
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 542, 548-49 (1977).
61 See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591-99 (1935).
'9 See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-39 (1977).
70 Id. at 335.
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only discrimination as to means-a willingness to permit blacks,
but not whites, to bear the exclusionary effect of a ban on multi-
family dwellings.
One of the reasons the Constitution forbids action motivated
by a covert desire to achieve a discriminatory goal is that such a
proscription is necessary to enforce the prohibition against ex-
plicit goal discrimination. If only express goal discrimination
were prohibited, that 'ban could readily be evaded either by
deliberately framing a rule neutral on its face, but with an impact
as close as possible to that of an express classification,71 or by
utilizing a grant of discretion on a case-by-case basis to achieve
the effect of an express rule.72 The same policy against evading the
prohibition against express goals discrimination applies to means
discrimination. An expressly racial rule mandating discrimination
as to means certainly would be held unconstitutional. The city of
Washington could not, for example, have directed personnel of-
ficials to pick the best standardized reading test which did not ex-
clude more than 20 7o of white applicants. However, in the
absence of an explicit recognition of the category of means
discrimination, covert forms of means discrimination would be
constitutional. Unless the Court were able to recharacterize the
particular instance of means discrimination as involving an im-
permissible goal, such discrimination would not fall within the
prohibition of Washington v. Davis and its progeny.
As a practical matter, to accept the propriety of discrimina-
tion as to means often would be to sanction discrimination as to
ends as well. A decade or two ago, bigoted state officials were
brazen or foolish enough to engage in actions which, even in
isolation, were explicable solely in terms of race, but that era is
largely past.73 Today, an official of even the most modest
sophistication understands the importance of devising a nonracial
pretext for such an action, and the decision is rare which does not
arguably serve some rational nonracial end. If means discrimina-
tion were not recognized as constitutionally impermissible, once a
nonracial goal had been injected into a controversy, a plaintiff
would be obligated to establish not only that race entered into a
"! See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
72 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
73 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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government's action but also that the consideration of race
affected the government's selection of goals rather than its choice
of means. This frequently would be impossible to prove. It is im-
portant, as a theoretical matter, to distinguish between discrimi-
nation as to ends and discrimination as to means, but constitu-
tionally it should be irrelevant whether race entered into a deci-
sion about goals or a decision about means.
Requiring a plaintiff to prove at trial which mode of discrim-
ination was present in his or her case would impose a requirement
that few litigants could meet. If government supervisors responsi-
ble for establishing hiring criteria inquired into the racial impact
of possible standards and carefully selected the job requirements
which excluded the largest possible portion of blacks, their
actions clearly would appear to be racially-based. If, however,
the officials testified honestly that their goal was not to exclude
blacks, but only to upgrade the caliber of public employees, and
that they merely preferred that blacks pay the cost of that im-
provement, their testimony would be an adequate defense unless
the Constitution forbids means discrimination as well as ends
discrimination. Were proof of the existence of a nonracial goal
thus sufficient to uphold an act of discrimination, most instances
of discrimination as to ends could be recast and defended on such
grounds.
To recognize that discrimination as to means is prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment is not to recreate the disparate impact
rule rejected in Washington v. Davis.74 Nor is the prohibition
against means discrimination the equivalent of the rule disap-
proved of in Feeney-that a decision is unconstitutional if the
decisionmaker could have foreseen the decision's disparate
impact.75 Like goal discrimination, but unlike either disparate im-
pact standard, means discrimination depends on the actual men-
tal state of the decisionmaker. The disparate impact tests refused
to inquire into the motives which in fact influenced the decision;
the simple disparate impact test ignored actual motivation en-
tirely, while the foreseeable disparate impact test merely pre-
" 426 U.S. at 239.
15 442 U.S. at 278-79.
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sumed intent. 76 In contrast, the prohibition against means
discrimination acknowledges that policy makers make decisions
about the means by which their goals are achieved and forbids
them to make those decisions based on race. Application of this
standard serves better to adapt the application of the constitu-
tional prohibition against discrimination to the realities of policy
making and to facilitate a more sensitive and rigorous analysis of
claims that race "at least in some measure, shaped ' 77 a disputed
decision.
IV. Methods of Proof
In assessing a claim of goal discrimination, we often ask
whether the same policy would have been adopted if it had not
had any adverse effect, i.e., if its burdens and benefits had been
fairly distributed among blacks and whites. Thus, in determining
whether a city adopted a high school degree requirement for new
employees in order to exclude blacks, we would inquire whether
it would have adopted that requirement if the proportions of
blacks and whites lacking such degrees were the same. This is an
appropriate hypothetical question, for if a decisionmaker's sole
goal were to discriminate against blacks, he or she would not
have taken the disputed action unless blacks were actually dis-
advantaged by it. But this is the wrong hypothetical question to
ask in resolving whether a collateral decision regarding means
was racially-based.
In order to detect means discrimination, it is necessary to ask
whether the same decision would have been made if its racial im-
pact had been reversed, i.e., if the disparate impact had been on
whites rather than on blacks. The achievement of a particular
racially-neutral end might be regarded as important enough to
justify the collateral burdens if they were to be borne by blacks
alone, or by a comparable proportion of blacks and whites, but
be deemed insufficient to warrant the imposition of those
76 See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1038-40 (1979); Perry, supra note 67, at 579; Schwemm,
supra note 5, at 1011 (approving foreseeability rule); Note, supra note 5, at
1391-96 (disapproving foreseeability rule).
442 U.S. at 276.
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burdens on a disproportionately white group. Thus, a racist deci-
sionmaker might choose a means burdening blacks over a means
burdening whites and might forego pursuing the goal if the only
means available placed the burdens on whites. For example, a city
official interested in adopting a high school degree requirement
for an entirely legitimate purpose might refuse to do so if it ex-
cluded a disproportionate number of whites although he or she
would utilize the test if it harmed blacks or if it had no racial im-
pact at all. Despite such racially-based decisionmaking, the
responsible official could state truthfully that although his or her
action had had an adverse impact on blacks, the same action
would have been taken if its consequences had been
racially-neutral. 78
The problem of means discrimination thus requires a dif-
ferent question because a nonracial goal is, by definition, in-
volved in such a case. Although race is, in fact, the basis for the
means decision when the adverse impact falls on blacks, the
neutral goal might provide a sufficient ground for the same deci-
sion so long as there is no adverse impact on whites. Hence, the
only way to ascertain whether a means decision was free of racial
considerations is to ask whether the same decision would have
been made if the racial impact were reversed.
Two evidentiary factors cited in Arlington Heights-the
magnitude of the disparate impact on minorities, and any history
of discrimination by the authorities involved-are central to
resolving a claim of means discrimination. 79 Although the Court
has been divided as to the relevance of these factors to claims of
71 Consider the case of a state personnel officer who wanted to adopt job-related
hiring criteria so long as none of them resulted in a predominantly black work
force; assume that height and mathematical skill are both job-related, but that
the tallest applicants are all black, while those with high mathematical abilities
are all white. The official would choose to use a math test as a hiring criterion,
but to disregard height. If rejected black applicants challenged this action, the
official could testify that his or her decision to use the math test would have
been the same even if it had no adverse impact on blacks, yet the decision was
unquestionably racially-motivated. That would be made clear only by asking the
official if he or she would have used the math examination if it eliminated all
whites rather than all blacks.
7429 U.S. at 266-67.
Discriminatory Intent
goal discrimination,80 their application to claims of means
discrimination yields workable and sensible results.
The magnitude of the adverse impact8' on minorities is im-
portant because it determines the size of the hypothetical burden
on whites. This factor involves four distinct considerations: the
severity of the impact on the affected minority group members,
the total number of minority individuals so affected, the propor-
tion of minority individuals who are affected adversely, s2 andthe
80 See supra text accompanying notes 7-32.
", A given decision about means often involves benefits as well as burdens.
Because of the magnitude of those benefits, or because of hostility to confer-
ring any benefit on blacks, an official could conceivably make a decision about
means which is based on this unwillingness to allocate benefits to blacks. A claim
that this had occurred would raise a different issue than a claim that there had
been means discrimination with regard to the allocation of burdens, even though
both are forms of means discrimination. In passing on a such a claim, the first
critical factual issue would be the magnitude and distribution of the benefits,
not the burdens.
" See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 270 (98% of women in the
state adversely affected). Justice Stevens' concurrence in Feeney, which Justice
White joined, illustrates both the importance of considering the proportion of
minority individuals who are adversely affected by a decision about means and
the irrelevance to the question of means discrimination of the fact that a substan-
tial number of non-minority individuals are adversely affected. Justice Stevens
asserts that "the number of males disadvantaged by Massachusetts' veterans'
preference (1,867,000) is sufficiently large-and sufficiently close to the number
of disadvantaged females (2,954,000)-to refute the claim that the rule was in-
tended to benefit males as a class over females as a class." Id. at 281 (Stevens,
J., concurring). In Feeney, the number of males disadvantaged was large only
because the rule was one of statewide application. The number of men so in-
jured was 63% of the number of women. Presumably, Justice Stevens still would
have been satisfied if the veterans' preference had eliminated all women
(2,978,000) so long as the number of men eliminated rose a comparable amount
(i.e., to 1,882,000). To adopt such a standard of proof is to sanction the total
and intentional exclusion of a minority so long as the decisionmaker is astute
enough to exclude a substantial number of majority group members. Where the
pool of applicants substantially exceeds the positions or benefits available, the
rejection of majority group members is inevitable, and in those cases, that re-
jection is of no evidentiary significance. If Massachusetts had required all state
police or state-employed lawyers to be over six feet tall, thus excluding virtually
all women and many men as well, Justice Stevens would find virtually conclusive
evidence that the state was not trying to limit its police or legal positions to
men in the fact that there are many men under six feet in height.
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proportion of those adversely affected who are minorities.83
Reversing the races of those subject to the adverse collateral ef-
fects is likely to matter to the decisionmaker if under his or her
original decision the proportion of minority individuals adversely
affected is high or if most of those adversely affected are
minorities. Thus, an employment criterion would be particularly
suspect if most of those excluded were black (e.g., 5001o of blacks
pass, but 90qo of those rejected are blacks) or if most blacks were
excluded (e.g., 500qo of those rejected are black, but 900%0 of all
blacks are eliminated).
The other critical issue is whether the history of the decision-
maker's actions affecting minorities suggests a willingness to
adopt means which have a serious comparative adverse impact on
whites. A background of intentional racial discrimination or-
dinarily would conclusively demonstrate an unwillingness to
make such decisions. A city with a record of policies whose direct
and intended consequences were to disadvantage blacks would a
fortiori be reluctant to adopt for the achievement of nonracial
goals any means whose consequences would advantage blacks.
Conversely, one would expect that, over the course of a series of
decisions, a decisionmaker indifferent to the racial consequences
of his or her decisions about means would make some decisions
with an adverse impact on whites. Thus, it is also appropriate to
examine whether, particularly in related fields, policy decisions
were made that had an impact on whites as adverse as that which
the disputed decision had on minorities.
Recognition of the distinction between goal and means
discrimination and application of the proper method of proof of
means discrimination offer a more objective and predictable
framework than now exists for analyzing claims of racial
discrimination. For example, in Washington v. Davis a finding of
no discriminatory intent remains appropriate, but the basis for it
is now more apparent. Although the disputed test had an adverse
impact on black applicants, it seems clear that the test would have
been used even if that impact had been on whites. The extent of
the adverse impact on blacks was limited; thus, reversing the
11 Cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977)(Title VII challenge
to employment criteria under which 97% of all those excluded were women).
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racial impact of the test would not have radically reduced the
number of whites ultimately hired. Even a slight reduction might
have been unacceptable to a city determined to do everything
feasible to maintain or increase the proportion of whites on the
force. But the city of Washington was unlike those employers
who had done little, other than adopt paper affirmative action
plans, 84 to increase minority employment; under the leadership of a
black mayor and black police chief, the city had in fact engaged
in an affirmative effort to recruit minorities85 which had succeed-
ed in raising the proportion of black police officers from 17% to
36% in only six years.86 This practice necessarily reduced the pro-
portion of whites actually hired and may have done so to an ex-
tent comparable to the effect of a test with an adverse impact on
whites.
The decision in Feeney, on the other hand, is clearly incor-
rect. The employment criterion in Feeney had a severe adverse
impact since almost all women were ineligible for the absolute
preference. The exclusion of women, even those far more
qualified than male veterans, was apparently deemed an accept-
able social cost of realizing the legislative desire to assist veterans.
Had the sexual impact of the veterans' preference been reversed,
it would have excluded 98% of all male applicants and virtually
guaranteed that only women were hired for many highly paid and
responsible positions.87 The only jobs for which qualified men
could have competed on an equal basis would have been clerical
and secretarial positions. The central issue is whether
Massachusetts would have adopted in 1896 a veterans' preference
with such an impact or would have amended its statutes suc-
cessively in 1919, 1943, 1949, and 19688 to assure such preferen-
tial treatment for new generations of predominantly female vet-
erans.8 9 The all too familiar history of discrimination on the basis
14Cf. Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530F.2d 1159,1168, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976)(fact that employer made earnest efforts to remedy effects of prior
discrimination not sufficient defense against Title VII claim).
85 See 426 U.S. at 235.
8 Brief for Petitioners at 9.
S7 See 442 U.S. at 270.
11 See id. at 266-67.
89 In the district court, Judge Murray, who voted to uphold the preference,
asserted that the critical issue was whether "the veterans' preference statute
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of sex in this country renders implausible the suggestion that any
state would have adopted or maintained any civil service criterion
with such an impact. The possibility that a state would have
limited equal opportunity for men to secretarial positions borders
on the absurd. The evidence in Feeney, far from suggesting that
Massachusetts would have tolerated the application of a hiring
practice with such a devastating effect on men, revealed a history
of intentional and express exclusion from professional and ad-
ministrative positions of those few women not already eliminated
by the veterans' preference.0
This method of analysis also supports the decision in Keyes
v. School District No. 1.91 In Keyes, the school board was proven
to have engaged in the intentional segregation of students within
one portion of the district, and students elsewhere in the district
who were required to attend neighborhood schools were also
racially isolated. The Supreme Court stated that, in the absence
of contrary evidence adduced by the board, these facts were suffi-
cient to establish that the entire district was intentionally
segregated. The majority reasoned that such discrimination as to
one portion of the district created a presumption that, by some
means neither proven nor suggested, similarly motivated policies
had brought about racial isolation elsewhere. 92 As an inference
[would] have been enacted if women were represented in the armed services in
such numbers that the preference would have no discriminatory effect." Feeney
v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 156 (D. Mass. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Per-
sonnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). For a discussion of why this was
simply the wrong question to ask, see supra text accompanying note 78. The
judges in the lower court who concluded that the preference was unconstitu-
tional came much closer to enaging in the proper inquiry. See supra note 45.
90 See, e.g., Exhibits 64-79, No. 78-233, October Term 1978. These exhibits
include job announcements for professional and administrative positions expressly
requiring that the applicant be male. The state conceded in Feeney that, at least
until 1971, there were "gender-based distinctions in the civil service law." Brief
for Appellants, at 49 n.37.
Although women were in fact hired by the state, they received only secretarial
and clerical positions. "Few, if any, females have ever been considered for the
higher positions in the state Civil Service." Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F.
Supp. 485, 498 (D. Mass. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
91 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
91 Id. at 207-08.
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about goal discrimination this is troubling, for the Court acted
without consideration of what demographic or boundary con-
siderations may have been the proximate cause of that isolation.
As a presumption about the goal of the neighborhood school
policy, Keyes also is troubling, for many school boards follow
such a policy even in the absence of any racial impact. The result
in Keyes is far more plausible if one assumes that the
neighborhood school policy had a nonracial goal, such as
minimizing the distances traveled by students, and inquires
whether the school board's decision to accept the inevitable col-
lateral consequence-segregation-of achieving that goal was
racially-based. To this analysis, the critical issue is whether the
school board would have adopted the same neighborhood school
policy if that policy had had the effect of thoroughly integrating
the affected schools.93 The board's actions in intentionally
segregating students in other schools was highly relevant to that
question and provided ample basis for a presumption that the
neighborhood school policy would not have been adopted if it
had had an integrative rather than segregative effect. Ordinarily,
as in Keyes, evidence that the challenged decision had a severe
disparate impact on a given minority and that the decisionmaker
had a history of discrimination against the same group would, if
unrebutted, be sufficient to establish that the decision was
racially-based. 94
Under Teamsters v. United States,95 the presence or absence
of discriminatory intent determines whether a seniority system
which perpetuates the effect of past discrimination is exempt
from challenge under Title VII.96 Because the test of
discriminatory intent under Title VII is ordinarily the same as the
constitutional standard, 97 the necessary inquiry under Teamsters is
not limited to an analysis of the goal of that seniority system. The
fact that a seniority system advancing a non-discriminatory goal
had the consequence of perpetuating the effect of a few isolated
"' See id. at 208.
94 See id. at 210.
95 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
91 Constitutional and Title VII intent cases are cited without distinction in
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-39, 335 n.15.
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incidents of discrimination would not be substantial evidence that
the system was not bona fide, especially where the incidents were
unknown to those who created and maintained the system. In
such a situation, the effect of reversing the racial impact of the
system would be small, and there would be little reason to assume
that such an alteration would have seriously offended key union
or management officials. But a very different situation is
presented by a seniority system adopted by a company or union
which had systematically discriminated against minorities. In
such a case, the number of whites disadvantaged by reversing the
racial consequences of the system might well be quite
substantial, 8 and union or management officials, or both, would
have a clear record of hostility to providing equal employment
opportunities for blacks. The structure and rules of the seniority
system involved would determine whether the system would
preserve or undo earlier discriminatory hiring and promotion
decisions. Whatever other purposes such a system might serve,
officials who previously engaged in discrimination against
minority job applicants are highly unlikely to create or maintain
a seniority system which would reverse their own earlier misdeeds
and exclude whites from the better paid or more pleasant posi-
tions. These circumstances would be compelling evidence of
means discrimination regarding the creation or maintenance of
such a seniority system.
Conclusion
Because of the enormous variety of circumstances presented
by discrimination claims, no universal and mechanical test for
their disposition is possible. But the substantial and escalating
divisions within the Supreme Court in resolving discrimination
cases are both undesirable and, to a significant degree, avoidable.
If the intent requirement is to become a reasonably predictable
rule of law which vindicates the principles underlying the equal
protection clause, the Supreme Court must develop a more
11 This might occur because blacks were assigned to less desirable departments
or other seniority units or because blacks, having been denied any jobs at all
until recently, were at the bottom of the seniority ladder.
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sophisticated understanding of the various kinds of governmental
decisionmaking and an appreciation for the variety of ways in
which racist attitudes may shape official decisions. Recognition
of the distinction between goal discrimination and means discrim-
ination is an essential step in that process.
Racial discrimination in the selection of the means by which
to accomplish a given goal is as unconstitutional as racial
discrimination in the choice of the goal itself. In an era when long
established and important policies often can be effectuated only
through sacrifice and retrenchment, the courts must be vigilant to
assure that these burdens are not allocated on an invidious racial
basis. Proof of the existence of a legitimate goal does not end the
inquiry, but merely provides a perspective from which to assess
the motivation behind the decision to achieve that end in a par-
ticular manner.

